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1. Introduction  
 
Since the start of the so-called third wave in 1974, and the acceleration after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, democratization has been impressive. According to 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (2011), one-half of the world’s population now 
lives in a democracy of some sort. More specifically, 12.3% lives in full 
democracies, 37.2% in flawed democracies, 14.0% in hybrid regimes, and still 
36.5% in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes, in which the military 
plays a direct (when a junta rules the country) and indirect role (when the army 
guarantees the monopoly of violence for a civilian despotic government), are the 
second largest regime group. A similar ancillary role can be found in hybrid 
regimes. A recent literature in political economy (Acemoglu et al. (2010) and 
Besley and Robinson (2010)) analyses the relationship between the civil 
undemocratic government and the military as an agency problem: the civilian 
government needs the army to avoid internal violence, but a larger army reduces 
the opportunity-cost for the military to run a coup d’état and seize power. These 
papers derive three main causes of military coups: income inequality, ethnic 
fractionalization, and external threat.  
The current work is intended to empirically analyze a step forward. In fact, 
we investigate the existence of a military rule on a panel of 48 African countries 
for the 1970-2007 period controlling for a number of economic variables. That is, 
we do not analyze the outbreak of military dictatorships, but the economic 
conditions that make a military rule possible. In fact, actual conflicts do not take 
shape in a vacuum. An actual conflict would not take shape in the absence of a 
continuing and latent conflict. Put differently, the outbreak of an actual conflict 
(as a civil war or a coup d’état) can be considered as a revelatory event of a 
permanent continuing conflict. Then, we are interested in the existence of a 
continuing conflict and the institutions which take shape consequently. In a 
game-theoretic perspective, institutions as the rules of the game are the 
equilibrium of a game between parties in a society. This idea, in a game-theoretic 
perspective, has been labeled ‘the institution as-an-equilibrium approach’ (Aoki, 
2001: 15). This approach underpins our empirical study. In sum, the current 
work is intended to empirical analyze some determinants that make a ‘military 
equilibrium’ possible at a given point in time.   
In other words, when studying the factors associated with the existence of 
a military rule, we are highlighting the ‘pillars’ of that societal equilibrium. 
needless to say, it must be also remarked that results have to be interpreted cum 
grano salis. A military rule can effectively affect at least some of the economic 
and political variables that we henceforth use as explanatory. In order to draw 
some additional insights in this respect, we also use one- and five-lag of the 
economic variables on the presumption that, for example, the GDP per-capita of 
five years ago is not determined by the presence of a military dictatorship today, 
whereas bad economic conditions at that time can influence the existence of such 
a dictatorship later on.  
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 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on 
military dictatorships drawing both from economics and political science. Section 
3 describes the empirical model and the data, whereas results are discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
There are several strands of literature that are related to the topic of this work. 
The complex relationship between the civil power and the military is becoming 
important in the recent political economy literature. Seminal works on political 
economy of dictatorships are Wintrobe (1988), Wintrobe (1990) and Mcguire and 
Olson (1996). Recently, Besley and Robinson (2009) analyze the opposition 
between civil government (democratic or non-democratic) and military 
dictatorship, and Acemoglu et al.(2010)1 analyze the three categories of non-
democratic civil government, military dictatorship and democratic civil 
government. Both studies identify the army as agent of the powerful elite, an 
instrument to guarantee its survival through the repression, necessary because 
of the predatory policies they impose. The relationship between the uneven 
income distribution and the relevance of the army becomes stronger, overall in a 
contest where the political competition takes shape between polarized groups, 
which fight to obtain power and rents. These groups originate along different 
cleavages, as ethnic or regional origins, religion, ownership of the production 
factors and so on. The clash between these polarized and fragmented groups 
determines winners and losers, which violently fight to gain the control of the 
State (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006; Montalvo and Reynal Querol, 2007; Alesina 
et al., 2003 and Fearon, 2004). Therefore, a social situation with different groups 
fighting for power raises the opportunity for civil war and coup d’état.  
 Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, is characterized by the turnover 
between unconsolidated democracy, hybrid democracy, civil autocracy and 
military dictatorship. For example, authoritarian systems are based on a non-
existent political pluralism and the power is shared between some organizations 
that guarantee support and security to the regime.2 In military dictatorship the 
army has the most important role on stage, its power is less checked and could 
show worrying examples, like kleptocratic regimes (Acemoglu e al., 2003), where 
the dictator can grab a lot of resources and guarantee his survival through the 
divide-et-impera. In this context, it is possible to see a challenge between the elite 
of different groups to gain the control of the State. In human history, moving 
from the land and agricultural production to the industry and manufacturing 
production, the social relations between the groups have produced cleavages and 
                                                 
1 They follow the way opened by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). 
2 According to Ghandi and Przeworski (2007), the autocratic ruler could solve the problem 
constituted by the opposition in two ways: if the threat comes from inside the ruling groups, 
“consultative councils, juntas, and political bureaus” will be created to permit the confrontation 
between the different ideas; if there is an outside threat coming from powerful groups, 
institutions that nominally could be grouped under the democratic procedures are established. 
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 violence that characterize the different societies. The emergence of new groups 
gives rise to new elites that want to handle the rents and revenues (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2006). In the context of the developing countries - where 
productive sectors like manufacturing, productive agriculture, utilities, services 
and others are very weak - this process has the goal to obtain central power, with 
the wealth given by oil, diamond or others.3  We can see the groups compete for 
the control of the three basic aspects regarding the production factors: 
appropriation, division and production. In our framework, this drives differences 
in the opportunity to enjoy the public goods between losers and winners, through 
different enforcement of the property rights and contracts (Tangerås and 
Lagerlöf, 2008; Gonzales, 2005, 2010; Dal Bò and Powell, 2007).  
 As notedin Bolhken (2009), the risk of a coup d’état could be a strong 
deterrent to uncontrollable episodes of rent-seeking, corruption and extra-budget 
funds than the electoral process in democracies. The combination between the 
democratic checks and military risk reduces the appropriation of the state 
wealth. This is the same dynamics that Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) use to 
explain the transformation of the political system: 1) a situation without violence, 
because there is redistribution (fairness) between the groups, driving to 
cooperation. They claim that here income inequality would be very low, so that 
the elite does not fell threat from the extending of the redistribution; 2) to 
respond to the violence caused from no fairness in the redistribution, the ruling 
elite could co-opt the most productive and dangerous groups, sharing with tem 
the wealth and the rents of the country. Here income inequality is higher than 
before, and this threats the conservative elite; 3) the elite does not want to share 
the rents with other groups, therefore causing competition and violence. Once 
again, income inequality is very high. Hence, it is possible to say that higher 
income inequality could raise the probability of a civil war and, consequently, 
request a larger army for the repression. But, at least, this could increase the 
opportunity for coup d’état. In this contest, both Besley and Robinson (2009) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2010) see the army like guardian of the elite, as an agent that 
acts to defend it from the risk of civil war. The central government will choose 
the size of the army, but it faces an agency problem: the army may not only be 
the instrument to defend the elite, but may seize the power. If the government 
increases the size of the army to respond to a higher risk from the loser groups, 
this rises the opportunity for a coup d’état, because diminishes its opportunity-
cost.   
 Besley and Robinson (2009) follow the way paved by Besley and Persson 
(2008, 2009) in which the state capacity, the quality of institution and the 
problem of violence are analyzed. In particular, state capacity is the quality of 
the legal and fiscal capability of the central power. The low level of these two 
aspects raises income inequality, uneven distribution of public goods and bad use 
of wealth, creating tensions and grievances in the society. When property rights 
and contracts are not properly enforced (low legal capacity) and the level of 
taxation is collected from a source that is not under the complete control of the 
                                                 
3 Caruso (2010) and Ricciuti and Costa (2010). 
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 government - like natural resources - (low fiscal capacity) the distribution of the 
public goods between the different groups is highly uneven, thus raising the risk 
of civil unrest. To maintain their economic, social and cultural insulation, the 
elite has to establish an efficient monopoly of violence. The loser groups that are 
not protected by right and contract, and that could not check the use of taxation 
and state rents, presenting unequal and low income, have the opportunity to use 
the civil war to gain the central power. So, the government has to create an army 
in order to counter this threat. However, the establishment of a bigger army may 
turn to be dangerous, because the military can actually exploit the use of force. In 
such a case, a classical principal-agent problem would take shape. As pointed out 
by both Persson and Robinson (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2010), the military 
could act no more like agent of the government, but in their own interest. In 
particular, if the military believes that they are not paid a ‘fair wage’, they could 
behave as more like self-interested agent than agent of the central government. 
In sum, this increases the probability of a coup d’état.4 
 Acemoglu et al. (2010) identify three different patterns to underline this: 
1) the civil government could decide not to use the repression and hence 
establishes a little army, favoring the cooperation and a smooth transition to 
democracy. The new democratic government faces a big problem: in order to 
consolidate democracy it is necessary to reform the army, but they do not want to 
be reformed. Here it is possible to find a commitment problem, because the 
government has to promise to the military that it will not reform it – otherwise 
they will block the transitional process - but to permit the consolidation of the 
democracy this reform is necessary; 2) the civil government may want to use 
repression against social opposition. They create a big army but they have to pay 
a right price (wage and public goods) that avoid the recourse to coup d’état. The 
non-democratic government remains in office and the coup d’état does not 
happen; 3) The government uses the army to avoid the opposition take the power, 
so they create a big army but they are unable, or do not want, to pay the right 
price for their services. Eventually, the army takes the power establishing a 
military dictatorship. The same dynamics could be extrapolated from Besley and 
Robinson (2009): the civil government needs the help of the army, through the 
repression, to block the social opposition and the risk of civil war, but has to pay 
the right price for this action and protection. If this does not happen, the military 
seize the power putting down the previous government. This vicious cycle 
characterizes both models, helping to explain the relationship between the 
redistribution of public goods, civil war and coup d’état.  
 There is a growing evidence that a low level of institutional quality is a 
fundamental source of waste of the wealth (La Porta et al., 1999). In addition, it 
also determines an uneven distribution of public goods between different groups. 
So, a low institutional quality stimulates the grievances of the loser groups, 
boosting their willingness to use the violence and increasing the probability that 
                                                 
4Kimenyi and Mbaku (1996) argued that in autocratic regimes the military elite is in a position to 
extract rents, because without the support of the military the government is in general not able to 
sustain itself. They empirically confirmed the negative relation between transfers to the military 
and the degree of democracy for developing countries. 
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 a civil war takes shapes. This makes more likely that central elite/government 
resort to the repression by the army, creating a larger one, rising the likelihood of 
a military dictatorship. In general, provision of public goods differ dramatically 
between democracies and dictatorships. Democracies exceed dictatorial provision 
(Deacon, 2009).   
 Needless to say, there is predictable linkage between the availability of 
natural resources and such kind of argument. A large mining sector, for example, 
increases the size of a contestable “pie” between competing groups. Put 
differently, the rents emerging from controlling the mining sector increase the 
likelihood of an actual conflict between the ruling group and the military or 
another competing group. That is, the existence of natural resources contribute to 
the insulation of the elite in charge, by reducing the capacity of enforcing 
property rights and contracts, thus raising the risk that the loser groups use 
violence and civil war to depose the government. Consequently, natural resources 
increase the probability in the use of repression through the army, and, 
eventually the likelihood of a military dictatorship.5 
 External factors can also affect the probability of a coup d’état: if a 
country has some neighbors experiencing ethnic wars and violence, and inside its 
borders it reproduces the same cleavages, it could be influenced by this 
circumstance, reproducing these problems. That is, a contagion effect may exist. 
However, Besley and Robinson (2009) and Acemoglu and al. (2010) emphasize 
that if a country perceives a serious threat of a war between two states, this 
would reduce the risk of a coup d’état because the army is now necessary for the 
survival of both the government and the state. Therefore, the politicians 
(democratic or non-democratic) have to pay the right wage to soldiers, solving the 
commitment problem that we have analyzed before. A credible threat on the 
borders can reduce the coup's risk. De Groot (2012) emphasizes the role of 
external influences in determining political freedom in Africa. He finds that the 
probability of an improvement in political freedoms increases with an history of 
political freedom, openness, improvements in ethnolinguistically similar 
neighboring countries. 
 Coups d’état in Africa have received some attention in the literature by 
sociologists and political scientists. Jackman (1978) is the seminal work in this 
field. He estimates a model of the structural determinants of coups d'état for the 
new states of Sub-Saharan Africa in the years from 1960 through 1975. Results 
indicate that social mobilization and the presence of a dominant ethnic group are 
destabilizing; a multiparty system is destabilizing (especially when a dominant 
ethnic group exists) while electoral turnout in the last election before 
independence is stabilizing. Johnson et al. (1984) replicate the previous work 
concentrating on military coups, finding serious weaknesses in the original 
Jackman model. Their dataset includes 35 Sub-Saharan African states from 1960 
through 1982. They find that states with relatively dynamic economies6 whose 
societies were not very socially mobilized before independence and which have 
                                                 
5Aslaksen and Torvik (2006), Collier and Hoffler (2005a), Collier et al. (2009), Caselli (2006),  
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) and Bornhorst et al. (2008). 
6 Defined as those experiencing growth in industrial jobs, GDP and urbanization.  
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 maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political 
pluralism have experienced fewer military coups, attempted coups, and coup 
plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics. 
Jenkins and Kposowa (1990), using data on military coups in 33 Sub-
Saharan African states between 1957 and 1984, find strong support for 
modernization and competition theories of ethnic antagonisms, military 
centrality theory and aspects of dependency theory. Political development theory 
is not supported. Ethnic diversity and competition, military centrality,7 debt 
dependence, and political factionalism are major predictors of coup activity. 
Ethnic dominance is a stabilizing force creating social integration and weakening 
opposition. Intractable conflicts rooted in ethnic competition and economic 
dependence appear to create a structural context for military coups and related 
instabilities. 
O'Kane (1993) argues that the underlying causes of coups are 
specialization in and dependency on primary goods for export, exacerbated by 
poverty. A testable hypothesis is deduced from this theory which is examined 
through the application of discriminant analysis to data for three sets of African 
countries. The models support the theory. Moreover, the chance of a successful 
coup is negatively related with the absence of a previous coup and the continuing 
or historic presence of foreign troops since independence.  Tusalem (2010) finds 
that over the 1970-1990 period the likelihood of a military coups is reduced by 
the protection of property rights. 
Lunde (1991) studies African coups d’état during the period from 1955 to 
1985. The starting point is a replication of Jackman (1978) when continuous-time 
hazard models of event history data are used instead of the panel regression 
approach. The event history approach focuses on the rate of coup d'etat over time 
rather than some index of coup d'etat. The results lend some support to 
modernization theory. The social contagion hypothesis and the history of political 
instability are also supported. Finally, the results indicate that the likelihood of a 
coup strongly depends on time  
Collier and Hoeffler (2005b) in a panel of African countries from 1960 to 2001 
highlight strong similarity in the causes of coups and civil wars, finding that low 
income and lack of growth are among the main determinants. Both are also 
subject to ‘traps’ – once a coup or civil war has occurred, further events are much 
more likely. Finally, policies that favor the military (high military spending) may 
increase the risk of a coup. 
 
3. Model and data 
We estimated the following panel data probit model: 
 
Militaryit= α1 + α2 Xit+ α3 Zit + α4Wit + α5Pit + α6 Sit + α7 Cit + εit 
 
                                                 
7 Military centrality is an index including the number of troops and internal security forces and 
the defense budget as a percent of GNP. 
7
  The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the current ruler is a 
military junta and zero otherwise. Data are taken from the “Database of Political 
Institutions 2010” (Beck, 2001).8 The vector Xit includes GDP per capita, derived 
from Penn World Tables 6.39 (Heston et al., 2009), and the added value of the 
agricultural, manufacturing and mining sector10 as percentage of GDP, using the 
UNCTAD database.11 The vector Zit includes variables concerned with ethnic 
fragmentation, distinguishing between polarization and fractionalization, we use 
the data from Reynal-Querol.12 Wit is a vector including variables concerned with 
the external sector: openness (the sum of imports plus exports over GDP, from 
the Penn World Tables 6.3) and the intensity of external treat,13 defined as level 
of hostilities on a 0-to-5 scale, taken from the database Militarized Interstate 
Disputes 3.10 (Ghosn et al., 2004).14 The vector Pit includes the Agricultural Raw 
Price, taken from Free Market Price Index, and the Crude Oil Price, derived from 
Free Market Price Index (calculated as the average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally 
weighted ($/barrel)) from UNCTAD. In this way we want to check whether higher 
levels of the commodity market prices can lead to riots, which in turn could 
influence the army to take action. Because changes in oil price can have different 
effects in countries that are exporters or importers of oil, we include a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the share of oil export exceeds 10%, and 0 
otherwise.15Cit is a vector of dummy variables describing the colonial rule of a 
country. Finally, εit is a random error.  
All estimates are obtained by using random-effect probit panel data. The 
random effects panel probit model is the best viable option since it is not possible 
to estimate a fixed effects probit model consistently with a fixed number of 
periods (see Verbeek, 2000: 337). All variables are in logs. Table 1 reports the 
summary statistics.16 Military dictatorships are widely spread in our dataset, 
since they account for about 41% of our observed regimes.  
We should note that manufacturing is, in general, a small percentage of 
output (the mean is 10.20 percent, the median is 8.83 percent). The only country 
with a sizable manufacturing sector is South Africa (the mean is 21.250 percent). 
South Africa also stands out for a much higher average GDP per capita ($ 
8,055.456 vs. $ 2,798.751). For these reasons South Africa is a natural candidate 
as an outlier, therefore we replicate the estimations with and without it as a 
robustness check. 
                                                 
8 The dataset is available at http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40. 
9 The database is available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. 
10 Original data include “Mining, manufacturing and utilities” from which we subtract the item 
“Manufacturing”. Utilities create some noise in the measurement of the mining sector, however 
its size is small. 
11The database is available athttp://unctadstat.unctad.org. 
12 The dataset is available at http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm.  
13 We have also used a variable for internal conflict, since one can expect that a military 
dictatorship arises as a response to social turmoil. However, this variable never turned out to be 
significant. Details are available upon request.  
14 The dataset is available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
15 CIA Factbook. 
16 A correlation matrix is available upon request from the authors. 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
The results cannot be interpreted as causal, since military rule can affect 
at least some of the economic and political variables that we use as independent 
ones. Therefore, we also use one- and five-lag of the economic variables on the 
presumption that, for example, the GDP per-capita of five years ago is not 
determined by the presence of a military dictatorship today, whereas bad 
economic conditions at that time can influence the existence of such a 
dictatorship later on.  
 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports our baseline results. The coefficient of Income per-capita is 
significantly negative. Higher income per capita reduces the likelihood of 
experiencing a military rule. Its marginal effect on average is equal to -0.14.  This 
is probably related with the ‘modernization hypothesis’, which claims that higher 
income is related with higher interest for the bourgeoisie to play a role in the 
political arena, therefore leading to the establishment of democratic institutions. 
Clearly, it is not possible to establish a clear-cut causal relationship since even 
the inverse relationship can hold (i.e., the military affects negatively the 
economic growth). Manufacturing and primary sector are significantly positive, 
raising the probability of having the army in office. While this seems 
understandable in agrarian economies in which large owners tend to support 
conservative political parties (and possibly the military) against the possibility of 
land reforms, we expected an opposite result for manufacturing since this is 
usually related with an emerging bourgeoisie, which pushes for democratic 
institutions. Instead, the results suggest that entrepreneurs are likely to seek 
protection from military. In particular, this might be true with regard to foreign 
direct investments. In fact, in Sub-Saharan African countries, a large share of 
manufacturing sector descends from foreign direct investments.17 In quantitative 
terms, the average marginal effect on the probability of a military junta of 
manufacturing is 0.11, whereas for the mining sector it is -0.02 and eventually 
for primary sector is 0.10.  
Polarization and fractionalization have opposite effects, the former increases 
the probability of a military rule, while the latter decreases it. Marginal effects 
are 0.12 and -0.14, respectively. Larger openness to international trade 
negatively affects military rule. A country that is more connected with the world, 
in which democratic countries play an important role, probably perceives 
negative effects (both culturally and in economic terms) in the relationship with 
                                                 
17 The role of FDI in gross capital formation in Africa can be drawn analyzing figures available 
every year in the World Investment Report by UNCTAD. For example, in the period 1990-2010 
the annual contribution of FDI inflows to gross capital formation in West Africa rose from 13.8% 
to 26.8%, in central Africa from 0 to 40.8%, in east Africa from 1.7% to 12.9% and in southern 
Africa from 0 to 14.5%. On average in 1990 in sub-Saharan Africa the contribution of FDI to gross 
capital formation was 3.9 in 1990 and 23.75% in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2010).  
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 its partners of relinquishing democracy in favor of military rulers. This confirms 
the liberal idea of closed and authoritarian regimes which precipitate into 
underdevelopment. However, albeit statistically significant, the marginal effect 
turns to be small (i.e., -0.05). The Oil price is usually insignificant, and negative 
when significant, while the intensity of external threat and agriculture raw price 
are always insignificant. However, being an oil producer increases significantly 
the probability of a military rule. Eventually, being landlocked increases the 
probability of a military rule, so indirectly confirming that landlockedness affects 
negatively societal development fuelling civil unrest and military coups. The 
British colonial legacy also decreases the probability of a military junta.        
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
  In Table 3 we analyze a number of possible nonlinearities. First, we 
include income per capita squared. Its coefficient is significantly negative, 
maintaining that a the probability of experiencing a military dictatorship raises 
up to a certain threshold income level and then is reduced. This seems consistent 
with the notion of developmental dictatorship, a situation which is, for example, 
the case of Chile and South Korea. In both countries the autocratic shock led to 
economic policies that sustained growth. Second, we interact a number of 
variables. In some cases we interact variables that taken individually show 
opposite effects. Interestingly, the effect of openness on the probability of military 
junta turns to be positive in when interactions between the degree of openness 
and sectors’ sizes are taken into account. In particular, if considering the 
interaction between the size of manufacturing sector and the degree of openness, 
we find that (i) the association between the degree of openness itself and the 
probability of a  military junta is positive ; (ii) the coefficient of the interaction 
term of the degree of openness and the size of manufacturing is negative. On one 
hand this confirms what has been highlighted above. Intuitively, foreign 
entrepreneurs in manufacturing sector seeks protection from military order thus 
pushing the effect of openness on the positive side. On the other hand, since the 
interaction term is able to capture the external relations of local economic agents, 
presumably, the negative association descends from the more general 
impoverishing impact of closeness.  
  In contrast, Openness tends to outweigh the Primary sector when 
estimated together. This is also the case of Polarization with respect to the 
Primary sector . The interaction between Intensity of external threat and 
Fractionalization is significantly positive. This can be explained when 
considering that a military junta can motivate its existence by facing an external 
threat which would be difficulty countered by a fractionalized country.18 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                 
18 This might also be the case in which two neighbor countries are ethnic fractionalized and a 
group that has the majority in one of them is the minority in the other one. Given the exploitation 
exerted by the larger group on the smaller one, this can lead to threat by one country on the other 
one in an attempt to stand for the fellow ethnic group. 
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  Table 4 addresses the issue of dynamic effects in the relationship between 
military rule and our covariates. We include as regressors one- and five-lag of all 
variables but fractionalization and polarization, which have very limited 
variability. Typically, five-year lagged variables are more significant than one- 
year lagged variables. The main results are confirmed in terms of the variables 
that were significant when treated simoultaneously. This is also true in terms of 
marginal effects. Probably, the two most important variables that turn out to be 
significant are: 1) intensity of external threat, in particular when 5-years lagged, 
although with a small marginal effect (0.027), and the Mining share of GDP with 
both lags, showing marginal effects equal to 0.09. When a serious external threat 
occurs, the military is likely to become more powerful (in terms of resources and 
political role) and afterwards this can lead to a coup. This is in contrast with the 
predictions of the benchmark theoretical models by Agemoglu et al. (2010). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the probability of a country of experiencing a 
military dictatorship, using a panel of 48 African countries over the period 1970-
2007. We found a number of results. Income per capita negatively affects the 
probability of a military rule, with some nonlinearities, in particular lower levels 
of income per capita increases the probability of having the military in office, 
whereas as long as it increases the probability gets smaller. Manufacturing and 
primary sectors are positively related with military rule, whereas the share of 
GDP deriving from natural resources is insignificant. Larger openness to trade 
negatively affects military rule. Polarization and fractionalization have opposite 
effects, the former increases the probability of a military rule, while the latter 
decreases it. External threat becomes significantly positive only when lagged. 
Finally, crude oil may price negatively affect military rule, whereas agricultural 
price is usually non-significant. 
Future research may address the issue of duration of military regimes and 
the distinction between civilian and military dictatorships both in terms of the 
socio-economic circumstances that may lead to such governments and as far as 
differences in the policies implemented by these regimes are concerned.   
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Table 1 – Summary statistics 
  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Military .409 .492 0 1 
GDP per capita (logged) 7.547 .836 5.031 10.062 
Manufacturing share of GDP  (logged) 2.097 .762 -3.432 3.703 
Mining share of GDP  (logged) 1.351 1.379 -3.971 4.526 
Primary share of GDP  (logged) 3.199 .757 .616 4.591 
Polarization .537 .190 .020 .840 
Fractionalization .633 .262 .050 .960 
Openness (logged) 4.068 .655 .685 5.773 
Intensity of external threat .823 1.623 0 5 
Crude Oil Price (logged) 4.133 .794 2.015 5.530 
Agricultural raw price (logged) 4.621 .319 3.683 5.101 
Landlocked (dummy) .313 .464 0 1 
Oil producer (dummy) .163 .370 0 1 
UK colonial origin (dummy) .416 .493 0 1 
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Table 2 - Existence of Military Rule, baseline results (Panel RE Probit) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10† 11† 
GDP per capita -.702*** -.467*** -.148 -.457*** -.343*** -.599*** -.240 -.860*** -.113 -.348** .060 
  (.105) (.129) (.143) (.129) (.127) (.157) (.149) (.182) (.162) (.190) (.167) 
Manufacturing share of GDP  .318*** .709*** .311*** .337*** .392*** .490*** .512*** .342*** .469*** .371*** 
  (.098) (.113) (.101) (.101) (.110) (.117) (.115) (.112) (.114) (.116) 
Mining share of GDP  -.042  -.041  -.125**  -.087  -.068  
  (.054)  (.055)  (.061)  (.062)  (.062)  
Primary sector share of GDP   .920***  .550***  1.205***  .844***  .891*** 
      (.197)   (.159)   (.207)   (.216)   (.215) 
Polarization .373*** .431*** .083  .386***   .502***   .151   .087  .846*** .327*** -.369*** .572*** 
 (.107) (.116) (.116) (.115) (.116) (.135) (.135) (.161) (.130) (.150) (.145) 
Fractionalization -.556*** -484*** -.064 -.487*** -.605*** -.190 -.264** 
-
1.081*** -.417*** .049 -.667*** 
  (.111) (.115) (.114) (.116) (.116) (.136) (.130) (.191) (.128) (.153) (.140) 
Openness  -.275*** -.002 -.204*** -.117*** .057 .194* -.238*** .133 -.310*** .143 
  (.083) (.101) (.084) (.094) (.107) (.119) (.104) (.130) (.101) (.128) 
Intensity of External Threat      -.031 -.032 -.024 -.011 -.0144 -.039 
            (.037) (.036) (.036) (.037) (.039) (.037) 
Crude Oil Price    -.285*** -.296*** -.224 -.188 -.159 -.161 -.164 -.146 
    (.106) (.102) (.155) (.157) (.158) (.162) (.161) (.162) 
Agricultural raw price        -.431 -.430 -.414 -.377 
                (.352) (.355) (.355) (.356) 
Oil producer  .826*** 1.556*** .856*** 2.093*** .891*** 1.242*** 1.142*** 1.916*** .741*** 1.229*** 
  (.183) (.240) (.187) (.193) (.215) (.207) (.233) (.259) (.237) (.245) 
Landlocked  .156 .081 .064 .163 .013 .064 .849*** -.169 -.152 -.496*** 
    (.126) (.123) (.121) (.135) (.138) (.134) (.171) (.149) (.134) (.171) 
UK        -.597*** -.738*** -.629*** -.884*** 
16
  
                (.132) (.160) (.141) (.173) 
Constant 4.391*** 3.376*** 
-
4.369*** 4.20*** 1.070 3.915*** 
-
4.349*** 7.99*** -1.12 4.911** -2.445 
 (.748) (.891) (1.524) (1.014) (1.507) (1.292) (1.919) (2.13) (2.584) (2.219) (2.578) 
Obs. 1353 1352 1353 1352 1353 1105 1106 1105 1106 1078 1079 
Log Likelihood -534.83 -521.702 -512.163 -517.713 -512.907 -415.747 -405.622 -417.684 -407.757 -409.682 -406.062 
Wald χ2 56.75 72.44 97.30 75.75 165.96 50.02 77.99 127.57 106.98 100.90 110.38 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, * significant at 10%. In columns with †, South Africa is excluded from the sample.    
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Table 3 - Existence of Military Rule, nonlinear effects (Panel RE Probit) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6† 7† 
GDP per capita 2.763** 5.443*** 7.215*** 7.148*** 11.678*** 7.107*** 5.919*** 
 (1.360) (1.55) (1.713) (1.751) (1.959) (1.878) (2.186) 
GDP per capita squared -.201** -.426*** -.531*** -.526*** -.882*** -.522*** -.426*** 
  (.095) (.110) (.123) (.124) (.141) (.133) (.157) 
Manufacturing share of GDP 1.853*** 2.403*** 2.083*** -.030 -.1749 .670 1.074 
 (.471) (.478) (.601) (1.141) (.700) (.689) (.709) 
Mining share of GDP  .253  1.127**  1.13***  
  (.290)  (.592)  (.362)  
primary sector share of GDP   1.516  -3.822***  -1.758 
      (1.175)   (1.383)   (1.462) 
Polarization .492*** 1.513*** 7.095*** .527*** 6.033*** 1.418*** 5.812*** 
 (.130) (.150) (1.278) (.155) (1.514) (.185) (1.624) 
Fractionalization -.241 .156 -.635*** 1.578*** .732*** 1.257*** .751*** 
  (.240) (.239) (.284) (.347) (.320) (.321) (.322) 
Openness .338 .634*** 1.947** .110 -3.375*** .359 -1.12 
 (.209) (.198) (1.062) (.330) (1.300) (.297) (1.361) 
Intensity of external threat    .062 .045 .084 .111** 
        (.051) (.050) (.051) (.052) 
Openness * manufacturing 
sector share -.459*** -.601*** -.404*** .043 .130 -.137 -.185 
 (.118) (.120) (.151) (.279) (.174) (.175) (.178) 
Openness * mining sector 
share  -.027  -.305**  -.295***  
  (.069)  (.152)  (.088)  
Openness * primary sector 
share   -.407*  .858***  .424 
18
  
      (.245)   (.301)   (.319) 
Fractionalization* 
manufacturing -.090 -.500*** -.208 -.667*** -.617*** -1.095*** -.588*** 
 (.121) (.119) (.136) (.161) (.161) (.168) (.161) 
Polarization* Primary   -1.647***  -1.535***  -1.600*** 
   (.359)  (.422)  (.457) 
External threat * 
fractionalization    .251*** .235*** .260*** .280*** 
        (.082) (.083) (.084) (.085) 
Oil producer    -.456* 1.486*** .053 2.229*** 
    (.270) (.212) (.225) (.239) 
Landlocked    -.177 .080 -.969*** 1.042*** 
    (.205) (.146) (.176) (.186) 
UK    -1.648*** -.489*** -.897*** -.800*** 
        (.304) (.152) (.168) (.185) 
Constant -10.904*** -20.0125*** -32.855 -23.513*** -23.268*** -25.120*** -16.72 
 (4.742) (.5.391) (7.338) (6.196) (8.55) (6.626) (10.11) 
Obs. 1353 1352 1353 1105 1106 1078 1079 
Log Likelihood -518.287 -515.606 -505.170 -402.303 -393.223 -399.492 -389.04163 
Wald χ2 64.42 170.72 175.52 163.14 199.28 125.43 201.55 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, * significant at 10%. In columns with †, South Africa is excluded from the sample.    
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Table 4 – Existence of Military Rule (Panel RE Probit) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6† 7† 
GDP per capita 1 year lagged -.510* -.581** .065 -.479* -.262 -.888*** -.277 
 (.304) (.302) (.311) (.294) (.303) (.317) (.379) 
GDP per capita 5 years lagged .292 -.015 .141 .375 .198 .133 -.016 
  (.292) (.323) (.322) (.334) (.326) (.342) (.326) 
Manufacturing share of GDP 1 
year lagged  .456*** .607*** .287 .440*** .376** .646*** 
  (.181) (.1800) (.186) (.188) (.187) (.223) 
Manufacturing share of GDP 5 
years lagged  -.293* -.171 -.054 -.161 -.198 -.063 
    (.178) (.181) (.180) (.189) (.186) (.196) 
Mining share of GDP 1 year 
lagged  .244***  .202*  .376***  
  (.108)  (.114)  (.119)  
Mining share of GDP 5 years 
lagged  -.206**  -.352***  -.331***  
    (.105)   (.112)   (.113)   
Primary sector share of GDP 1 
year lagged   .777**  .887**  1.016*** 
   (.378)  (.397)  (.417) 
Primary sector share of GDP 5 
years lagged   .359  .194  .185 
      (.383)   (.397)   (.409) 
Polarization .788*** 1.247*** .323*** .114 .490*** .675*** .766*** 
 (.169) (.186) (.130) (.142) (.138) (.168) (.184) 
Fractionalization -.631*** -1.226*** -.627*** -.151 -.338*** -.562*** -.402*** 
  (.158) (.194) (.133) (.139) (.134) (.164) (.160) 
20
  
Openness 1 year lagged -.018*** -.019*** -.013*** -.015*** -.014*** -.017*** -.012*** 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Openness 5 years lagged .006 .011*** .013*** .013*** .019*** .011*** .015*** 
  (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.005) 
Intensity of External threat 1 year 
lagged .004 .018 -.015 .013 .003 .060 .009 
 (.037) (.039) (.038) (.040) (.039) (.040) (.045) 
Intensity of External threat 5 
years lagged .094*** .091** .074* .069 .067 .132*** .070 
  (.041) (.042) (.042) (.043) (.044) (.044) (.049) 
Crude Oil Price 1 year lagged    -.270 -.308* -.257 -.297 
    (.184) (.185) (.180) (.185) 
Crude Oil Price 5 years lagged    .462*** .465*** .490*** .446*** 
        (.152) (.150) (.150) (.151) 
Agricultural raw price 1 year 
lagged    -.184 -.046 -.131 -.168 
    (.430) (.431) (.428) (.430) 
Agricultural raw price 5 years 
lagged    -1.400*** -1.319*** -1.589*** -1.29*** 
        (.343) (.337) (.337) (.345) 
Oil producer .974*** -.245 1.528*** 1.167*** 1.232*** .918*** 1.249*** 
 (.200) (.250) (.225) (.236) (.235) (.248) (.393) 
Landlocked .583*** -.559*** .451*** -.154 .131 -.381*** -.617*** 
  (.182) (.149) (.148) (.162) (.160) (.169) (.232) 
UK    -.888*** -.330*** -1.07*** -.855*** 
        (.146) (.141) (.171) (.201) 
Constant 1.49 4.993*** -7.728*** 6.628*** .903 12.52*** 2.88 
 (1.157) (1.207) (2.31) (2.462) (3.371) (2.48) (3.72) 
21
  
Obs. 1093 1091 1093 1091 1093 1063 1065 
Log Likelihood -394.700 -390.426 -380.027 -364.184 -371.375 -.368.482 -372.980 
Wald χ2 100.80 91.27 113.85 111.03 111.36 151.54 98.17 
Notes:  *** significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, * significant at 10%. In columns with †, South Africa is excluded from the sample.    
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